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Abstract 
 
Canada is known for its close relations with the United States in the domains of 
economic affairs, defence and international diplomacy. This arrangement, 
however, was a product of the great changes brought about by the Second World 
War. The combination of British decline, Ottawa’s desire to achieve full 
independence from London, and the looming Soviet threat during the Cold War 
created a political environment in which Canada had to become closely 
integrated with the United States both militarily and economically. Canada did 
so to ensure its survival in the international system. With the exception of a few 
controversial issues like US involvement in Vietnam (1955) and Iraq (2003) as 
well as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Ottawa has been Washington’s closest 
ally since 1945. On numerous occasions like the Korean War, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and as recently as the War in Afghanistan and the War Against IS (Islamic 
State), Canada had provided staunch military and diplomatic support to 
Washington in its engagements around the globe. 
In an era of relative peace, stability, and certainty, particularly during the 
Post-Cold War period and the height of American power from 1991 to 2008, this 
geopolitical arrangement of continental integration had greatly benefited 
Canada. This era of benefits, however, is arguably drawing to a close. The Great 
Recession of 2007-09, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the insistence 
on pursuing a foreign policy of global primacy despite its significant economic 
cost, are sending the US down an uncertain path. Due to its close relations and 
geographical proximity with the US, Canada now faces a hostile international 
environment that is filled with uncertainty as a result of superpower decline, 
great power rivalries, environmental degradation, and failed US interventions. 
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There are key questions which arise because of this hostile environment, which 
Ottawa must address. Will the US remain a reliable partner to Canada, helping 
ensure its survival? Is it time for Canada to consider a geostrategic realignment 
with the intent to seek new superpower allies to diversify its alliance system so 
it is not overwhelmingly dependent on the US? This paper will argue that it is 
time for Ottawa to consider further enhancing relationships with Canada’s 
European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Canada should 
particularly look to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as alternatives to 
American power and as key supporters to Canadian foreign policy. The basis of 
this argument stems from the increasingly plausible prospect of American 
decline as a global superpower. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has 
consistently acted in a way that undermines its position as a global power. If the 
pattern continues, Ottawa may face an increasing unstable and unpredictable 
Washington whose actions do not align with Canadian national interests.  This 
paper will begin with a definition of Canadian grand strategy for which foreign 
policy ultimately serves, and its evolution. The paper then examines how the 
decline of American power and its instability is a threat to Canadian interests, 
and how an enhanced alliance with Europe will serve as a better alternative. The 
paper concludes with defence policy recommendations on how Ottawa can turn 
this vision of enhanced Canadian-European cooperation into reality in the 
upcoming years. 
Canadian Grand Strategy: Objectives, Execution, History, and Current 
State 
Since the end of the Cold War, there is a common perception that Canada had 
effectively become an “astrategic” power, or rather, a country that does not craft 
its foreign and defence policy based on logical, sustained, and interrelated ideas 
that are typically found in strategic thought and international relations (Nossal, 
2016, p.151). Instead, Ottawa since 1991 has opted for an approach in which its 
defence and foreign policy are crafted based on the personal worldviews of its 
leaders, ruling elite, partisan politics mixed with popularism and ad hoc 
responses to external pressure (Nossal, 2016). This pattern is only a recent 
phenomenon. To determine whether or not a country is “astrategic,” a short-term 
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view of its foreign and defence policy history is insufficient. A broader, more 
comprehensive and long-term approach must be used.  
Based on its history, Canada is no different than any other state within 
the international system. Canada’s creation was a direct result of British colonial 
elites on the North American continent facing the environment of an aggressive 
United States, rapidly expanding across the continent and a retreating Britain 
that wanted to cut back on its military commitments to its colonies. As a result, 
Canada’s Fathers of Confederation and their successors had no shortage of 
appreciation for the realities of the international system. These “realities” are 
best described by the realist school of thought in international relations.  The 
central tenets of realism are: 
1. The international system is anarchic, in which there is no higher 
authority to control the behaviour of states; 
2. All states (particularly great powers) inherently possess offensive 
military powers that give them the ability to destroy on another; 
3. States are never certain of the intentions of others; 
4. The primary goal of states is to survive, specifically to maintain their 
territorial integrity and full control of domestic affairs; and 
5. States are rational actors and will think and act strategically to ensure 
their survival (Mearsheimer, 2014).  
Unlike many other states outlined in realist thought, Canada did not 
develop its diplomatic, economic, and military power to become a great power 
to have its voice heard on the international stage and deter potential enemies. 
Nor did Canada frequently use wars or coercion to change its environment to 
maximize survival (Mearsheimer, 2014). There are two reasons behind this 
peculiarity. First, there is a prevalent political culture among Canadians and their 
leadership on placing the rule of law and peaceful resolutions to conflict as a 
premium (Ross, 2017). Second, Canada is a state with serious geostrategic 
deficiencies. Canada is the second largest sovereign landmass in the world 
making it a continent-sized state (Chapnick, 2007). However, it has an economy 
and the military capabilities of a middle power, and a population (in proportion 
to its landmass) of a small power (only 36 million) (Chapnick, 2007). As a result, 
not only does Canada lack the national capabilities to influence international 
events outside its borders, it also lacks the capability to effectively defend its 
own borders without incurring an unbearable economic and social cost 
(Chapnick, 2007). Therefore, in order to accomplish its strategic objectives, 
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Ottawa since Confederation has always utilized collective defence with another 
great power to safeguard its national security (Chapnick, 2007). 
There are two dominant approaches which Ottawa elites have utilized 
since Confederation to secure great power support for collective security. The 
first approach is the “East-West Approach,” which was the brainchild of Sir John 
A. Macdonald and the Conservative Party (Cox, 2005, p. 667-668). The idea 
behind this approach calls for Ottawa to create a powerful Canada that unites the 
northern half of North America and is sufficiently capable of defending itself 
against a militant US that still has the desire to conquer Canada, or any other 
threats that may originate outside the North America (Cox, 2005). Based on this, 
Ottawa ensured that strong economic, cultural, and political connections to 
Europe, particularly the British Empire, were maintained to safeguard Canadian 
interests and security (Cox, 2005). The second approach is the “North-South 
Approach,” devised by a conglomerate of English-Canadian merchants who 
were wronged by British imperialist and trade policies, as well as Anti-British 
Francophone Canadians, which together formed the backbone of the Liberal 
Party of Canada (Cox, 2005, p. 668). This approach calls for economic and 
eventual political integration with the US (Cox, 2005). The logic was that the 
close proximity of the US and their isolationist foreign policy will allow Canada 
to remain out of the imperial wars of Europe as well as allow for the easier 
assimilation of Quebec once an overwhelming English-speaking majority is 
formed in the new North American super-state (Cox, 2005). From Confederation 
to the end of the Second World War in 1945, Canada had largely followed the 
East-West Approach, as a result of British control over Canadian foreign policy 
and its status as the world’s leading military power. Subsequently, Canada was 
heavily involved in overseas wars, such as the Boer War and both World Wars 
(Cox, 2005).  
The North-South Approach started gaining legitimacy in official policy 
as a result of the horrors of the First World War and factors such as the reduction 
of American hostility towards Canada and the ruling Liberals’ desire under 
Mackenzie King to break Canada from British orbit. The end product of this US-
Canada rapprochement was the “US-Canadian Security Bargain” of 1938 (Barry 
& Bratt, 2008, p. 64). The basic premise was that the US would protect the 
territorial integrity of Canada, and in exchange Canada would do its due 
diligence to ensure it maintains sufficient military capabilities to ensure 
Canadian territory does not become a liability for US security interests (Barry & 
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Bratt, 2008). A year after this bargain, the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Hyde-
Parker Declaration were signed and ratified which promoted joint US-Canadian 
management of North American security and armament production (Barry and 
Bratt, 2008). This series of bargains and agreements would mark the official 
beginning of US-Canadian integration under the North-South approach. 
The Second World War fundamentally changed the geopolitical 
environment that Canada was situated in. The British Empire was in ruins and 
could no longer maintain its position as a global superpower or commit to the 
security of its subject states. Europe and Asia were devastated in the aftermath 
of the war and became the political battlegrounds of the US and the Soviet 
Union, the two countries which emerged as global superpowers following the 
war.   
Canada faced a geopolitical situation that was unseen in its history. First, 
the US emerged as the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere and was 
left unchallenged due to the devastation of European great powers (Sutherland, 
1962). This meant the US, whether out of security or geopolitical concerns, could 
easily annex Canada without worries of external intervention (Sutherland, 1962). 
Second, as per the US-Canadian Security Bargain of 1938, Canada’s end of the 
bargain was no longer a matter of simply defence policy and military posture. 
With the invention of long-range bombers (and later Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles, or ICBM) and nuclear weapons, both the US and Canada could no 
longer rely on the stopping power of water that rendered expeditionary 
operations by Eurasian powers nearly impossible (Kaplan, 2013). Major 
population centres, military installations, and leadership all came within the 
striking capabilities of Soviet ICBMs, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, 
with Canada located right on the critical midcourse routes and launch areas of 
Soviet military assets tasked with targeting the United States (Sutherland, 1962).  
Furthermore, the US at the time was a relatively young and inexperienced great 
power that had only recently emerged from an isolationist approach to 
international relations. This meant Washington could often act in ways 
threatening to international security. These factors placed Ottawa in a dangerous 
position from erratic American behaviour, or the destruction of Canada as a state 
due to conflict escalation between the US and the Soviet Union.  
To address this geostrategic disadvantage, Prime Minister Louis St. 
Laurent and his Foreign Minister Lester Pearson devised a complex strategic 
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scheme that maximized Canada’s survival via a combination of both East-West 
and North-East approaches.  
First, Ottawa further strengthened its commitment to continental defence 
with Washington by entering the North American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) agreement. In doing so, Ottawa committed itself militarily to bearing 
the burden of North American air defence and integrating Canada into a complex 
network of early-warning systems and coordinated fighter deployments with the 
US, ensuring the security of American ICBM fields and nuclear bomber bases 
(Sutherland, 1962). In return for this commitment, Canada maximizes its 
security via the deterrence power of American nuclear weapons and removes 
incentives for Washington to annex or strip Canada of its independence as a 
sovereign state by being a trusted ally. 
Second, in order to balance or restrain American unilateralism, as well 
as to diversify Canada’s collective defence partners, Pearson and St. Laurent 
pushed hard via all diplomatic means to create NATO. On the surface, many 
would recall NATO’s purpose as a collective defence organization that aimed to 
deter Soviet aggression in the Cold War. However, for Canada, NATO had a 
much greater strategic significance: by bringing all the Western European great 
and middle powers into a single alliance system with the US, it allowed Canada 
to have greater abilities to control American international behaviour. This is 
because NATO served as an avenue for Canada to rally great powers into 
collectively pressuring the US and prevent it from engaging in potentially 
destabilizing activities (Holmes, 1963).  
However, since the formation of this arrangement in the 1950s, Canada 
and NATO’s ability to influence American actions had been limited. Despite 
Ottawa’s diplomatic efforts and the use of personal relations-based approaches 
to counsel American leaders, it did little to prevent the US from acting in ways 
that got them into major crises. In the Korean War, when Pearson attempted to 
convince Washington to terminate the conflict that was inflicting an opportunity 
cost to the defence of Europe in 1950, he described the negotiation process as 
“Corporal Pearson and General Acheson”. This illustrates his subordinate role 
to the former US Secretary of State (Whitaker, 1991, p.15-16). It would take 
another two years for the US to terminate the conflict. As time progressed into 
the 1960s and 1970s, the situation was much of the same. The Americans would 
walk into the dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis and the strategic blunder of 
Vietnam, while Canada could do little more than protest. 
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Canada since the 1960's has given up its efforts in trying to influence 
American foreign policy. Ottawa began a long process of cutting its military 
spending and commitments to NORAD and NATO to a level just enough for 
Canada to have a say in the alliances’ decision-making processes (Whitaker, 
1991). Canada from the 1960s to the 2000s continued to adopt a more 
peacekeeping/ “honest broker” role in conflicts (Whitaker, 1991, p.21). In the 
early years of the 21st Century to the present, Ottawa further detached itself from 
international affairs by shedding its “honest broker” role, now straddling an 
isolationist role and that of a junior partner in NORAD and NATO.  
Simultaneously, Canada began a process of economic integration with the US 
through the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and later North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where Canada and the US (and later Mexico) 
became a de facto joint economic body that allowed Canada to generate 
economic prosperity from American success (Cox, 2005). 
To summarize, Canada had in effect become part of what Michael 
Ignatieff called the American “Empire Lite”, a system in which the US serves as 
the protector of its subordinate states (in this case Canada and European NATO) 
and creator of stable international environment that subordinates desire. In 
exchange, the subordinates offer diplomatic and military support to 
Washington’s military adventures and active contributions to US economic pre-
eminence (Ignatieff, 2006). By engaging in Empire Lite, Canada was able to 
obtain the security it desired without paying an unacceptable price. 
Impact of US Decline on Canada and a Case for Trans-Atlantic Solution 
For Ottawa, the biggest question that a US decline poses is the potential security 
implications for Canada. Unfortunately, given Canada’s economically and 
militarily integrated position to the US, there are no good outcomes for the future 
of Canadian stability. There are two outcomes that can result from Canada’s 
continuation of the North-South approach in an environment of ongoing great 
power rivalries and American decline entering an era of unpredictability.  
 First, if war were to break out, Canada would not be able to avoid the 
possibility of military strikes on its own soil. Due to the high levels of military 
integration with the US via NORAD, NATO, and the Five Eyes community, 
Canada is considered by Russia and China as the same target set as the US as 
many CAF and defence facilities within the country serve as support or force 
multipliers for American war-fighting capabilities. 
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 Second, if war does not break out but great power tensions reach Cold 
War levels, the strategic environment for Ottawa would still be concerning. As 
per the 1938 US-Canada security bargain, Washington would inevitably utilize 
a variety of social, economic, political, and military pressures to coerce Ottawa 
into adopting military force postures, acquiring military capabilities, or forcing 
American troops onto Canadian soil to bolster its own security (Barry & Bratt, 
2008). If any of these requests were to be rejected, it could result in the possible 
occupation of Canada or a Washington-sponsored regime change in Canada 
similar to the one in 1963 that brought Lester Pearson into power as a result of 
John Diefenbaker’s refusal to assist the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(National Post, 2015). 
 Whether great power wars start or not, the prospects for Canada’s 
survival are minimal, as the only fate awaiting Ottawa will be either state 
destruction via a nuclear fire-fight, or the end of Canada’s status as a sovereign 
state as a result of American actions. In the second decade of the 21st century, 
Canada is on the cusp of a power transition between two global superpowers; 
similar to the aftermath of the Second World War, the great power that is handing 
over power will once again be a key provider of Canadian security. Therefore, 
this paper suggests that there is only one solution for Ottawa. Ottawa must 
reduce Canada’s military and economic integration with the United States to 
minimal levels and pursue collective defence with another great power that is 
both more responsible on the international stage and more willing to hear 
Ottawa’s advice. 
(Back to) The Future: A Trans-Atlantic Solution 
Excluding the US, there is only one great power (or a community of powers) that 
Ottawa can rely on to replace the role of Washington; Canada’s European NATO 
allies. In particular, the leading states on the continent such as Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and The Netherlands due to their economic and 
military power (Eurostat, 2017). The primary reason why China and Russia are 
not considered is because currently, these two countries are the US’ strategic 
rivals. If Ottawa were to develop close relations with these two countries, 
particularly in the military sphere, it would trigger a harsh reaction from the US 
out of its security interests. 
 Other than being Canada’s only safe option for collective defence, 
European NATO members embody economic and strategic characteristics that 
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are compatible with Canadian interests. First, in terms of economic power, with 
a population of 511 million and a GDP of US$16.39 trillion (The World Bank, 
2017), European NATO members are a source of diversification for Canada. Due 
to Europe’s intense reliance on natural resource imports (European Commission, 
n.d.), and the signing the of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between Ottawa and Brussels in 2017 (European Commission, 2017), there will 
be significant potential for EU-Canada trade and economic integration in the 
years to come if Ottawa decides to further develop its relations with Brussels. If 
this deepened economic and political relationship becomes a reality, Ottawa will 
become less susceptible to Washington’s influence on defence and foreign 
policy issues via exploiting Canada’s heavy dependence on US-Canada trade (in 
which 20% of Canada’s GDP comes from exporting natural resources and goods 
to the US) (Embassy of the United States of America, 2014), which in turn will 
safeguard Canadian foreign policy independence. 
 Second, when it comes to political and strategic characteristics there are 
many overlapping values and interests that Europe shares with Canada. First, 
Europeans have a strong distaste for centralized rule over the continent. Instead, 
many states prefer pluralism, which over centuries became the defining 
trademark European of order and practices (Kissinger, 2015). Europe as such, 
strongly favours management of continental and international affairs within a 
multilateral framework as opposed to a unilateral alternative controlled by a 
single great power (Kissinger, 2015). Despite the recent decision of the UK to 
leave the European Union, the values that have prevailed in the continent still 
favour a multilateral framework, as opposed to a unilateral alternative, controlled 
by a single great power. Throughout history, the majority of Europe’s wars were 
fought to prevent the continent from being dominated by a single power, which 
can be seen in the Thirty Years War against the Catholic Church, the Napoleonic 
Wars led by Napoleon Bonaparte, and as recently as the two World Wars against 
Germany (Kissinger, 2015). Second, unlike the US, Europe tends to avoid 
conducting regime changes and imperial adventures abroad. Since the founding 
of its current power structure under both NATO and the EU by its post-war 
leaders, Europe has rejected the path of pursuing a foreign policy based on 
military primacy. Instead, it has chosen to create conditions for human 
betterment at home and abroad (Kissinger, 2015).  
When it comes to military affairs, France and the UK built nuclear 
arsenals just big enough to be considered great powers, and other European 
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states, much like Canada, built a conventional military with just the right strength 
to defend collectively against the Soviet threat as well as secure a voice in NATO 
decision-making and in turn influence the direction of US military pre-eminence 
(Kissinger, 2015). During the Cold War, except for the UK, France and The 
Netherlands, which conducted wars outside of Europe due to conflicts with their 
colonies, Europe has kept its militaries within the confines of the continent. This 
policy was maintained despite major disturbances like the Iran-Iraq War and the 
Arab-Israeli Wars which threatened oil imports (Gallis, 1987). In the 21st 
century, Europe remains consistent with such policy despite the dominance of 
US primacy. Since 1991, the Europeans have largely been critical of US 
overtures for regime change and primacy. As a result, many European states 
have largely refused to participate in any US-led foreign venture. Instead, in the 
last 26 years Europe has largely focused on peacekeeping operations in Former 
Yugoslavia and stability/capacity-building operations in the Sahel region in 
Africa and Mediterranean Littoral. The intention of these operations is to assist 
states in resolving conflicts before instability can expand into a regional crisis 
that would endanger European stability.  The only exception to this pattern 
would be the War in Afghanistan and Libya, where Europeans joined US regime 
change operations either to check and influence Washington’s unilateralism or 
to fulfill the geopolitical objectives of a few EU/NATO member states (Tierney, 
2016). These European overtures both ended in failure, which further convinced 
Europe that it should avoid military operations that are not absolutely necessary 
to its strategic survival. Furthermore, the failure of Afghanistan in particular has 
proved to the Europeans that the US will behave unilaterally when their 
perceived interests are at stake regardless of allied positions (Ross, 2011, p.36-
37).  
 Third, the election of Donald Trump and his lambasting of both NATO 
and the EU over their free-riding off US military capabilities, and accusations of 
achieving economic success at the expense of Americans, has pushed European 
tolerance of the US (Olterman, 2017). Additionally, American primacy on the 
European continent and its peripheries has caused further tensions. As a result 
of US pursuit of primacy against Russia through expansion of NATO and 
attempting to suppress Russian nuclear capabilities, Europe is now a target of 
Russian conventional military coercion. Moreover, unconventional hybrid 
warfare in which far-left and far-right movements spawned by Russian 
psychological warfare are threatening to destroy the political stability of nearly 
every major European power. 
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Furthermore, US wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to a certain extent Syria 
have led to the destabilization of the Middle East (Mearsheimer, 2017). The 
resulting refugee crisis in which millions of Afghani, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees 
flooded various European countries has triggered a massive wave of instability 
across Europe in the form of extreme racial tensions and terrorist attacks. As a 
result, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Francois 
Hollande announced that “Europe’s fate is in our hands” (Cook, 2017), which is 
now viewed by many as a declaration that European NATO and the EU will 
conduct their foreign and defence policy independent of American action.  
Though policies for creating a brand new joint military command among EU 
member states without the involvement of the US are new (Cook, 2017), some 
of the critical foundational work has begun. Most notably, Germany has created 
multinational brigades, where elite troops from various major EU/NATO states 
are integrated into the German military command and operational structure 
(Braw, 2017). The use of English as the lingua franca breaks down cultural and 
historical barriers, while the harmonization of operational procedures, and 
interoperability of military capabilities achieved in this framework will be very 
likely adopted by the EU (Braw, 2017). 
Policy Recommendations: Canadian Defence Policy in the Incoming New 
Era 
In order to make such a strategic realignment possible, Canada must undergo a 
significant change to its foreign and defence policy. This paper will only offer 
recommendations on Canadian security policies and CAF force structure in order 
meet this proposed change.  
 Ottawa must pursue a twin approach to its foreign and security. First, the 
1938 US-Canada Security Bargain and the implied threat to Canadian 
sovereignty it carries will be a reality that Ottawa will have to deal with so long 
as Canada exists as a sovereign state. With great power rivalries increasing to 
Cold War levels, and the introduction of cutting edge technologies, North 
America is once again under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Though the 
hypersonic weapons threat from China may be minimal due to the mutual 
assured deterrence, the Russian Tu-160M2 will pose a significant threat to 
continental security. Russia, like the US, has a nuclear counterforce first-use 
policy, in addition to being the power most threatened by American military 
primacy. There is a very high possibly that if tensions in Eastern Europe escalate 
and Moscow thinks a NATO conventional attack is imminent, Russia will resort 
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to tactical nuclear escalation to force the potential invading countries to halt their 
military advance (Majumdar, 2016). Utilizing Tu-160M2 bombers to launch 
conventional Kh-104 cruise missiles to target American BMD and C4ISTAR 
sites in North America could also potentially be a part of that plan. For Canada 
the prophetic assessment of late R.J. Sutherland is making a comeback: in the 
coming years, there will be heavy-handed pressure from Washington to coerce 
Ottawa to ensure Canadian soil, Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ), and 
areas of responsibilities under NORAD do not become gaps that Russian 
bombers can exploit (Sutherland, 1962). As a result, before enhancing its 
strategic relations with Europe, Ottawa must ensure the safety of the North 
American continent for the sake of its sovereignty and foreign policy 
independence. For the CAF, such policies will entail the major procurement of 
ABM and air defence capabilities in large numbers to ensure there is full defence 
coverage of North American airspace, as well as rapid response methods to deal 
with incoming Russian bombers. 
Second, Ottawa will inevitably be required to field a significant defence 
commitment that may even approach the level of Cold War commitments to the 
European continent as well as other geographical areas that are either joint 
concerns for both parties or just Europe. Though it is in the nature of collective 
defence that Ottawa contributes it forces to the alliance, there are two additional 
reasons why such commitments must be made. First, the security situation on 
the European continent has reached dire levels unseen even during the height of 
the Cold War. Russia has few strategic buffer zones and will likely attempt land 
grabs while also utilizing hybrid warfare to cause political disruption and create 
a more favourable strategic environment. As a result, in order to keep Europe a 
credible concert of great powers that can serve as a force multiplier for Canadian 
interests, Ottawa will have to inevitably commit a fairly large military contingent 
to reassure European states. To the same effect, the refugee crisis will also 
continue to cause disruption. Out of Canadian interests as well as for the security 
of its European allies, conducting a variety of peacekeeping and stability 
operations in these European periphery regions (particularly the Sahel Region 
and Libya) will become a necessity. As a result, a significant Canadian ground 
and naval commitment will be needed to carry out the dual tasks of preventing 
these regions from becoming failed states as well as curbing the flow of refugees 
into Europe. 
Resurrecting the CAF 
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The CAF at its current state is in a poor state to handle the two-theatre military 
mission that will be asked of it under this new foreign and security policy. Since 
the 1990s, and with the exception of the period between 2006 and 2008, the CAF 
has suffered a series of budgetary and political neglect by three consecutive 
governments, and as of 2017, Canadian defence spending has hit its historical 
all-time low straddling 1% of GDP (“North America”, 2017). As a result of this 
neglect and cutback, no service branches within the CAF are in a state to 
effectively fulfill their mandate. 
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is rapidly losing its capabilities 
to fulfill its mandate of North American continental air defence and support of 
NATO operations abroad. Since 1983 the procurement of its current CF-18 
Hornets, the fleet has rapidly decreased from 138 fighters to 77, due to the 
cannibalization of fighters to maintain operation readiness under a constrained 
budget (Gortney, 2017). This number is expected to further decrease as these 
fighters are now serving past their 30 years recommended shelf-life (Gortney, 
2017). If no new fighters are procured, the RCAF may be downgraded into an 
air patrol/police force as the degrading airframes and dated electronics render 
these fighters completely obsolete in a modern air war. This means in the near 
future they will not have the capabilities to effectively intercept incoming 
bombers heading towards North America or conduct air missions in contested 
aerospace. 
In 2017, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) became a de facto green-water 
navy that is only capable of independently operating within Canadian coastal 
waters and immediate maritime periphery as opposed to being a blue-water navy 
that can conduct maritime expeditionary operations. There are two primary 
drivers behind this degradation of operational capabilities.  
First, is the retirement of the Iroquois-Class guided-missile destroyer 
(DDG). This class of DDGs armed with SM-2 Block IIIA surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM) served a critical role of providing area air defence for a naval taskforce 
(Wagner, 2016). Without these SAMs and their ability to detect and engage 
incoming missiles from a long distance the Halifax-class frigates become 
extremely vulnerable as their Evolved Sea Sparrow SAMs are only designed to 
detect and engage incoming threats at a close range (Wagner, 2016).  
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Second, with the retirement of Protecteur-Class supply ships, none of the 
RCN’s warships will be able to operate far from Canadian waters (“North 
America”, 2017). The RCN is still internationally recognized as a blue-water 
navy however, because of the dual effects of the RCN’s high interoperability 
with the US navy (Wagner, 2016) and the naval replenishment agreement signed 
with Spain and Chile (“North America”, 2017). 
Third, the primary problem of the Canadian Army concerns its numbers. 
At the time of writing, the Canadian Army is approximately 34,800 strong with 
its frontline troops divided into three Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups 
(CMBG, with approximately 5000-6000 troops each) commanded by three of 
the five divisions currently fielded by the Canadian Army (“North America”, 
2017). Based on the CAF standard and battle-tested operating procedure, the 
“rule of three” must be followed in order to effectively sustain long term 
expeditionary operations for the Canadian Army, as well as the Royal Canadian 
Air Force and Navy. The rule of three states that whenever a major expeditionary 
operation is undertaken, the Canadian Army must dedicate three times the 
number of troops required to sustain the task. One unit will be in theatre, one 
unit will be preparing to deploy, and a final unit will be on a rest cycle (Gurney, 
2016). If any deployment exceeds the size of a battlegroup, the deployment will 
automatically turn into a full brigade level operation (Gurney, 2016). Given the 
Canadian Army’s current structure, the number of forces that the Canadian Army 
sustains will only allow Ottawa to commit effectively to a single theatre which 
will be grossly inadequate given the deteriorating geostrategic situation in both 
Europe and its peripheries (Gurney, 2016). 
Rebuilding the CAF after nearly three decades of neglect will require 
significant funding increases and equipment procurement from Ottawa that will 
run Canadian defence spending up to at least 2% (or double the current budget) 
and well beyond the increases recommended by Ottawa’s recent defence review 
(BBC News, 2017). This paper will only make recommendations for 3 important 
capabilities that the CAF would require (hereby the “Big Three”) under a 
Europe-aligned foreign and defence policy.  
The first is the replacement of the RCAF fleet of near-obsolete CF-18 
Hornet fighters. Whether for continental air defence or expeditionary operations, 
the RCAF must possess combat aircraft that are fast, possess advanced radar 
systems that are capable of detecting stealth aircraft, and utilize beyond visual 
range ordinance capable of destroying hostile aircraft at long distances (Ross, 
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2015). This will be particularly important when it comes to continental air-
defence and protecting American nuclear deterrence where the RCAF will be 
facing state-of-the-art and stealth capable Russian Tu-160M2 and Tupolev PAK 
DA bombers (Ross, 2015). The most ideal option for the RCAF would be 
American made fighters in the form of the F-22 Raptor, F-15C, or the F/A-18 
E/F Super Hornet (Ross, 2015). However, due to the Bombardier-Boeing trade 
dispute as well as the US-Canadian hostility over the NAFTA negotiation, it will 
be very unlikely for Ottawa to procure American-made fighters in the near 
future. 
The next best option outside of American made fighters will be the 
Airbus/BAE Eurofighter Typhoon. The Typhoon is a 4.5th generation fighter that 
possesses an immense amount of cutting edge capabilities that will meet, if not 
surpass, RCAF requirements. First, the Typhoon is equipped with the state-of-
the-art EJ-2000 turbine engine (Eurofighter Typhoon, n.d.). These engines make 
the fighter capable of flying at top speeds of Mach 2 with the use of afterburners, 
as well as the ability to fly at supersonic speeds while cruising, which are 
capabilities that no American fighters other than the F-22 and F-35 possess 
(Eurofighter Typhoon, n.d.). Because of these specifications, the Eurofighter 
Typhoon possesses an impressive combat radius of almost 1400km, which can 
be further extended with the use of mid-air refuelling (FAS Military Analysis 
Network, 2017). Second, the Typhoon is equipped with both an Active 
Electronically-Scanned Array radar and Infrared Search and Track suite for its 
avionics (Eurofighter Typhoon, n.d.), which provide the fighter the best means 
with current airborne technology of tracking stealth aircraft (Ross, 2015). What 
makes the Typhoon truly effective is the ordinance it is capable of carrying. Not 
only can the Typhoon carry all American-made air-to-air ordinance currently 
fielded by the RCAF, it is also equipped with the world’s deadliest air-to-air 
missile, the MBDA METEOR. The METEOR missile’s 100+km range, ability 
to conduct speed and course correction, and its massive no-escape zone (distance 
in which aircraft cannot evade incoming missiles solely by manoeuvre, give the 
Typhoon an edge that no state can currently match (Beckhusen, 2016). When the 
Typhoon gets forward deployed to airfields close to the approach path of any 
potential incoming bombers and working in conjunction with American 
capabilities via NORAD, the probability of a successful attack on the North 
American continent will be cut dramatically. Due to the characteristics of 
bombers being slow and lacking manoeuvrability, their chances of surviving or 
breaching an intercept by a fighter like the Typhoon will be very small. In 
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addition, due to recent upgrades, the Typhoon can utilize a wide variety of air-
to-surface ordinance ranging from anti-ship cruise missiles to precision-guided 
ordinances like the JDAM and Paveway bombs, which also makes the Typhoon 
an excellent platform for expeditionary operations (Beckhusen, 2016). 
The second item on this paper’s “Big Three” list will be the procurement 
of the Aegis Combat System for the RCN’s next generation warships to replace 
the current fleet of Halifax-class frigates in the late 2020s to early 2030. The 
Aegis is a dual role combat system that allows any equipped warships to have 
the capabilities of ballistic missile defence and area air-defence utilizing an array 
of sensors and radars, as well as an arsenal of missiles (SM-3 missiles for missile 
defence and SM-2 Block IIIA for area air-defence) equipped onboard Mark 41 
VLS pods installed on warships (Martin, n.d.). This system will resolve a large 
number of capability gaps the RCN faces. First, Canadian warships will regain 
the capability of independently operating in dangerous waters such as the Baltic 
Sea or eastern sections of the Mediterranean Sea where Russian A2/AD presence 
is heavy. Second, the ballistic missile capabilities of the Aegis could be tied into 
the American BMD system via the Aegis Global Network at any given time if 
the need arises to enhance North American continental security, thus giving 
Washington additional assurance that Ottawa is a staunch contributor to its 
security. This translates into more independence for Canadian foreign policy and 
the reduction of American pressure for freeriding.  
Finally, the last item of the “Big Three” will be a massive expansion of 
the Canadian Army. With the current structure of maintaining only three 
CMBGs, the Canadian Army will very likely face a scenario where its soldiers 
will be stretched extremely thin across many theatres, be overworked as rest 
cycles are cut to or moved from primary reserve positions at home into 
expeditionary roles, thus degrading the Canadian Army’s ability to address 
domestic emergencies. In order to prevent this, the Canadian Army must expand 
from the current three CMBGs to five or six. The process, which will involve 
recruiting up to 15,000 troops, will take many years to accomplish. However, 
Ottawa could start this process by converting the 1st Canadian Division, which 
currently serving as both a mobile headquarters and an operational enabler unit 
(made up of 4 Air Defence Regiment, 21 Electronic Warfare Regiment, and 4 
Combat Engineer Support Regiment), into a full frontline unit by adding a 
CMBG into its order of battle (Government of Canada, 2017). By doing so, it 
will temporarily help to alleviate the problem of being overworked in a potential 
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multi-theatre brigade-level expeditionary operation. By having a fourth CMBG 
to tap for manpower, smaller scale battlegroup-sized missions can be conducted 
despite having an entire CMBG already committed elsewhere. 
Conclusion 
Overall, Canada currently resides in a world that is undergoing a major shift in 
the global balance of power. The US, once seen as global superpower, is now 
seeing its hegemony challenged. Driven by this strategic thinking, the US has 
brought about its own decline by over-extending itself by simultaneously 
engaging in two wars that are proven to be decade-long quagmires, and great 
power rivalry with both a rapidly rising China and a resurging Russia. The 
problem of such over-extension has been exacerbated by Washington’s 
mismanagement of its economy, which led to the loss of livelihood for tens of 
millions of its citizens. Now, tensions are at an all-time high among great powers 
worldwide, with political elites in Washington that feel like there is a closing 
window of opportunity where a war must be fought to preserve America’s 
dominance.  
 For Canada, a middle power that requires foreign security guarantees 
either from a great power or a from collective defence alliance, will suffer 
grievously if it continues the status quo of extracting such guarantees from the 
US.  The only option that Ottawa can utilize to maximize its survival will be to 
distance itself from the US by returning to its roots and forming an enhanced 
security relationship with Europe that shares Ottawa’s concerns and vision 
beyond the framework currently established by NATO.  
 In the coming decades, Canada will witness a historic phenomenon that 
will mirror the events of 1945 to 1948 when the last change of global 
superpowers occurred. The key to Canadian salvation will once again be the 
strategic ingenuity and diplomatic excellence possessed by people like Louis St. 
Laurent and Lester Pearson, who guided Canada through its last superpower 
transition. However, given the unpredictability and potential volatility of the last 
transition, having capable leaders at the pinnacle of power in Ottawa is not 
enough. There also must a concerted effort by the Government of Canada and 
the Canadian public who have the will to settle for nothing short of success to 
accept the reality of the geostrategic environment that Canada currently resides 
in and take the action required to maximize chances of survival. That will 
inevitably include rebuilding the CAF to a size unseen since the height of the 
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Cold War despite unwillingness from both the incumbent government and the 
public.   
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